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Abstract
We analyse a principal-agent contracting model with asymmetric information between a
supplier and a retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer have the classical non-linear economic
ordering cost functions consisting of ordering and holding costs. We assume that the retailer has
the market power to enforce any order quantity. Furthermore, the retailer has private holding
costs. The supplier wants to minimise his expected costs by offering a menu of contracts with
side payments as an incentive mechanism. We consider a general number of discrete single-
dimensional retailer types with type-dependent default options.
A natural and common model formulation is non-convex, but we present an equivalent
convex formulation. Hence, the contracting model can be solved efficiently for a general number
of retailer types. We also derive structural properties of the optimal menu of contracts. In
particular, we completely characterise the optimum for two retailer types and provide a minimal
list of candidate contracts for three types. Finally, we prove a sufficient condition to guarantee
unique contracts in the optimal solution for a general number of retailer types.
Keywords: economic order quantity, mechanism design, asymmetric information, hidden
convexity
1 Introduction
We consider the classical 2-echelon Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) setting with a supplier and a
retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer act as fully rational individualistic entities (or agents)
that want to minimise their own costs. It is well-known that such individualistic viewpoints are
suboptimal for the entire supply chain. This loss of efficiency is often called the price of anarchy,
see for example Perakis and Roels 2007. We assume that the supply chain uses a pull ordering
strategy, i.e., the retailer places orders at the supplier. Therefore, the retailer’s ordering policy
is optimal for herself. The supplier can decrease his costs by somehow persuading the retailer to
change to a different ordering policy.
One way the supplier can do so is by offering a contract to the retailer that typically includes a
side payment or discounts. If the contract is accepted by the retailer, the costs for the entire supply
chain decrease and the resulting profit is divided between the two parties as agreed upon in the
contract. Being selfish, the supplier wants the largest possible share of this profit. Depending on
the type of contract, it is non-trivial to determine a contract that maximises the supplier’s profit
and that is accepted by the retailer.
The complexity of the matter is increased significantly if the retailer has private information
that is not shared with the supplier. For example, the retailer’s cost structure can be undisclosed.
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Furthermore, private information typically leads to inefficiencies for the supply chain, see for ex-
ample Inderfurth et al. 2013. This partial cooperation between the supplier and the retailer leads
to a principal-agent optimisation problem with asymmetric information.
In the case that the retailer holds private information, the supplier can use mechanism design
or incentive theory to improve his situation, see Laffont and Martimort 2002. That is, he presents
a menu of contracts for the retailer to choose from. We focus on constructing the optimal menu of
contracts that minimises the supplier’s expected costs, provided that the retailer is not worse off
by choosing one of these contracts.
1.1 Contracting model
To further specify the considered optimisation problem, we need to introduce the economical setting.
The retailer faces external demand with constant rate d ∈ R>0, which must be satisfied immediately,
i.e., there is no backlogging. Placing an order at the supplier has a fixed ordering cost of f ∈ R>0 for
the retailer. Delivery of the products is assumed to be instantaneous (no lead times). Furthermore,
the retailer has inventory holding cost of h ∈ R>0 per product and time unit.
Since we assume that the retailer minimises her own costs, she places an order if and only if her
inventory is depleted (the zero-inventory property). An order quantity of x ∈ R>0 products leads
to an average holding cost per time unit of 12hx and an average ordering cost of df
1
x . In total, the
average costs per time unit for the retailer is given by
φR(x) = df
1
x +
1
2hx,
which is minimised by ordering the well-known economic order quantity x∗R =
√
2df/h (see for
example Banerjee 1986). The minimal costs are φ∗R = φR(x
∗
R) =
√
2dfh.
The cost structure of the supplier is similar: the supplier has a fixed setup cost F ∈ R>0 to
handle an order and inventory holding cost H ∈ R>0. Production takes place with constant rate
p ∈ R≥d. To minimise his own costs, the supplier produces according to a just-in-time lot-for-lot
policy.
Per time unit the supplier has average holding costs of 12H
d
px and average setup costs of dF
1
x .
This leads to a total cost for the supplier of
φS(x) = dF
1
x +
1
2H
d
px,
which is minimised if the order quantity is x∗S =
√
2Fp/H.
The supplier and retailer both have their own optimal order quantity and either policy is
suboptimal for the entire supply chain (unless x∗R = x
∗
S). From the perspective of the supply chain,
the supplier and retailer can cooperate to lower the total joint costs. The joint costs are given by
φJ(x) = d(f + F )
1
x +
1
2
(
h+H dp
)
x,
with optimal joint order quantity x∗J =
√
2d(f + F )/(h+H dp). It is not difficult to verify that x
∗
J
always lies between x∗R and x
∗
S (see Lemma A.1). Therefore, lower joint costs can be achieved by
deviating from the individually optimal order quantities. Whether such coordination takes place
depends on further assumptions on power relations and market options.
As mentioned before, we assume that both the supplier and the retailer behave rationally and
want to minimise their own costs. Furthermore, assume that the retailer has the market power
to enforce any order quantity on the supplier. Consequently, the retailer chooses her own optimal
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order quantity x∗R by default, called the default ordering policy or default option. By using incentive
mechanisms, the supplier can persuade the retailer to deviate from the default policy. We analyse
using a side payment z ∈ R as an incentive mechanism for cooperation. Note that in the literature
side payments are sometimes called quantity discounts. The pair (x, z) of an order quantity x and
a side payment z is called a contract.
The presented contract (x, z) must be constructed such that the retailer is not worse off than
with her default option: φR(x)− z ≤ φ∗R. This condition is called the Individual Rationality (IR)
constraint or participation constraint. If the offered contract leads to the same costs for the retailer
as her default option, we assume that the retailer is indifferent and that the supplier can convince
the retailer to choose the contract preferred by the supplier. By assumption, the supplier can do so
without any additional costs. Hence, the retailer always accepts the presented contract if it satisfies
the IR constraint.
If the supplier has complete information of the supply chain, it is straightforward to determine
that the optimal contract offers the joint order quantity x = x∗J and minimal side payment z =
φR(x
∗
J)−φ∗R. The resulting ordering policy leads to perfect supply chain coordination: it is optimal
for the entire supply chain, as if there is a central decision maker.
However, we study the case that the retailer has private information on her cost structure:
either the ordering cost or the holding cost is private (but not both). We consider the case that
the supplier is uncertain about the retailer’s holding cost, which is without loss of generality as
will be shown in Section 2.1. The supplier has narrowed the retailer’s real holding cost down to
one of K ∈ N possible scenarios. Each scenario corresponds to a so-called retailer type. Type
k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K} has cost function
φkR(x) = df
1
x +
1
2hkx,
where 0 < h1 < h2 < · · · < hK−1 < hK are the possible holding costs. We assume that the default
option depends on the type. As such, we add the index k ∈ K to our notation to discern between
retailer types. For example, for type k ∈ K the default order quantity is xk∗R =
√
2df/hk with
corresponding costs φk∗R = φ
k
R(x
k∗
R ).
The supplier designs a menu of K contracts for the retailer to choose from, one for each retailer
type. For each type k ∈ K the supplier constructs a contract (xk, zk) that is individually rational
for that specific type, similar to before. However, the retailer can lie about her type and choose
any of the presented contracts. This situation is also called a contracting or screening game in the
literature, see Laffont and Martimort 2002.
Furthermore, the supplier assigns an objective weight ωk ∈ R>0 to each type k ∈ K, indicating
its likelihood, and minimises his expected costs. Without loss of generality, ω is a probability
distribution (
∑
k∈K ωk = 1), but this is not required for the model and our results.
This leads to the following non-linear optimisation problem:
min
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(x˜k) + z˜k) , (1.1)
s.t. φkR(xk)− zk ≤ φk∗R , ∀ k ∈ K, (1.2)
(x˜k, z˜k) ∈ {(x1, z1), . . . , (xK , zK)} , ∀ k ∈ K, (1.3)
φkR(x˜k)− z˜k ≤ φkR(xl)− zl, ∀ k, l ∈ K, (1.4)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
The designed contracts (xk, zk) must satisfy the IR constraints (1.2). The pair (x˜k, z˜k) denotes
the chosen contract by retailer type k ∈ K, which must be one of the presented contracts, see
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constraints (1.3). The retailer chooses the most beneficial contract for herself by possibly lying,
which is enforced by constraints (1.4). The supplier’s objective is to minimise his expected costs
including side payment, see (1.1).
Consider an optimal solution to the non-linear problem and suppose that the retailer lies about
her true type. By relabelling the presented contracts, we can construct another optimal solution
for which the retailer will never lie about her type, i.e., (x˜k, z˜k) = (xk, zk) for all k ∈ K. This is
also known as the revelation principle.
For example, suppose the retailer type i ∈ K lies being type j ∈ K. This implies that (x˜i, z˜i) =
(xj , zj) and in particular
φiR(xj)− zj = φiR(x˜i)− z˜i
(1.4)
≤ φiR(xi)− zi
(1.2)
≤ φi∗R .
So, contract (xj , zj) is individually rational for type i. Relabelling or redefining (xi, zi) to be equal
to (xj , zj) leads to an equivalent feasible solution where type i does not lie.
A direct consequence is that we can use the following equivalent simpler non-linear model:
min
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) ,
s.t. φkR(xk)− zk ≤ φk∗R , ∀ k ∈ K, (1.5)
φkR(xk)− zk ≤ φkR(xl)− zl, ∀ k, l ∈ K, (1.6)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
We call this simpler model the default contracting model. Here, (1.6) are the Incentive Compatibil-
ity (IC) constraints to prevent types from lying. These enable us to implicitly set (x˜k, z˜k) = (xk, zk)
and drop the choice of contracts completely from the model. Note that the menu of contracts with
(xk, zk) = (x
k∗
R , 0) for all k ∈ K is a feasible solution.
1.2 Connection to the literature
Similar models have been studied in the literature and there are many variations. One variation is
to consider a continuous range of retailer types such as in Corbett and De Groote 2000; Corbett,
Zhou et al. 2004. Pinar 2015 analyses the model with structurally different cost functions. In
Cakanyildirim et al. 2012 the roles of the supplier and retailer are swapped: the supplier has private
information and the retailer designs a menu of contracts. We focus on literature that closely relates
to our model, see also Table 1 for a comparison.
In this paper, we assume that only one cost parameter of the retailer is private, which leads to
so-called single-dimensional types. Pishchulov and Richter 2016 analyse the same setting, but with
two-dimensional retailer types. That is, both the ordering cost and the holding cost are uncertain.
Their research provides a complete analysis of the model in Sucky 2006, who considers the same
problem. Both use optimality conditions to determine a list of candidates for the optimal solution.
However, the analysis is restricted to only two retailer types, whereas we consider a general number
of types, albeit single-dimensional types. From our results we see different qualitative properties of
the optimal solution for two types versus more than two types.
Li et al. 2012 incorporate a controllable lead time into the contracting model. The retailer has
additional safety stock proportional to the square root of the lead-time demand. Only two retailer
types are considered. The two types are two-dimensional, but the type with low costs has lower
ordering and holding costs than the type with high costs.
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In Voigt and Inderfurth 2011 the supplier’s setup cost is an additional decision variable in
the contracting model. The supplier has to decide whether to lower his setup cost at the cost of
lost investment opportunities. Furthermore, the supplier has no holding costs and the retailer no
ordering costs. Besides the differences in cost functions, their model assumes the same default
option for all retailer types. To our knowledge, Voigt and Inderfurth 2011 is the only paper with a
related model that considers a general number of retailer types, although the authors do assume a
certain condition on the distribution of the retailer types.
Another model similar to ours is discussed in Zissis et al. 2015, but there are only two retailer
types. Furthermore, the supplier has no holding costs, which reduces the number of optimal menus
of contracts that can occur. Since we analyse the case for two types in detail, our results generalise
their derived structural properties of the optimal menu of contracts.
In light of the previous references, we emphasise that the inclusion of both ordering/setup costs
and holding costs for the retailer and supplier results in structurally different optimal menus of
contracts. This is because both involved parties have a finite individually optimal order quantity.
Deviating from that quantity leads to higher costs. This is not true if only one type of cost (ordering
or holding) is included, since then the individually optimal order quantity is either zero or infinity.
Furthermore, in the literature it is common to assume that the supplier prefers a larger order
quantity than the retailer. We do not make this assumption and therefore also provide insight into
contracts when the supplier prefers smaller order quantities.
Paper Supplier’s costs: Retailer’s costs: Number of types: Type-dependent Dimension of type:
Setup Holding Ordering Holding Two Multiple default option One Two
Sucky 2006 X X X X X X X X
Voigt and Inderfurth 2011 X X X X X
Li et al. 2012 X X X X X X X X
Zissis et al. 2015 X X X X X X
Pishchulov and Richter 2016 X X X X X X X X
Our paper X X X X X X X X
Table 1: Comparison of related literature.
1.3 Contribution
We consider a principal-agent contracting model with asymmetric information under the EOQ
setting. Our model distinguishes itself from the literature by having a general number of retailer
types with type-dependent default options. Furthermore, the supplier and the retailer types have
both ordering/setup costs and holding costs. Consequently, a typical analysis using optimality
conditions is complex and does not appear to lead to a generalisable solution method.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we show that this non-convex model has a hidden
convexity, which is achieved by a change of decision variables. Hence, in practice we can numerically
solve our model to optimality for a general number of retailer types using various efficient techniques.
Second, we determine structural properties of the optimal solution for a general number of retailer
types. The analysis shows significant differences in the structure of optimal menus of contracts for
two types compared to more than two types. Third, we prove a sufficient condition to guarantee
unique contracts in the optimal solution. We provide counterexamples when this condition is
omitted.
In particular, we use the structural properties to analyse the difference between two and three
retailer types. To do so, we analytically solve the model for these two cases. We provide a complete
characterisation of the optimal solution for the case with two retailer types. The derived closed-
form formulas of the optimal solution are not only simpler than those found in related literature,
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they also show additional structure of the solution. For the specific case of three retailer types we
did not find any results in the literature. We give a minimal list of candidate contracts for the
optimal solution.
The remainder is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present an alternative model which
shows the hidden convexity and leads to an efficient solution method. We continue with structural
properties of the contracting model in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the optimal menus of
contracts for two and three retailer types, where we give examples of each occurring optimal menu.
The derivations of the optimal contracts for two and three types are given in Appendices A and B.
We end with a general discussion of our results in Section 5.
2 Efficient solution method
In this section we show that the contracting problem can be solved efficiently. This insight becomes
apparent after a change of decision variables of the contracting model. Before we give the details,
we prove that for single-dimensional retailer types we can assume without loss of generality that the
retailer’s holding cost is uncertain. Consequently, we can efficiently solve two kinds of contracting
models.
2.1 Equivalence when one cost parameter is uncertain
Consider a contracting problem where all retailer types instead have the same holding cost h,
but different ordering costs fk. We can transform any such problem to an equivalent contracting
problem where all types have the same ordering cost fˆ , but different holding costs hˆk.
The transformation is as follows. For arbitrary dˆ ∈ R>0 and pˆ ∈ R≥dˆ, define the following
parameters:
ωˆk = ωk, Hˆ = 2(dF )
pˆ
dˆ
, Fˆ = (12H
d
p)
1
dˆ
, fˆ = (12h)
1
dˆ
, hˆk = 2(dfk).
These parameters are well-defined and result in a contracting problem instance where all retailer
types have the same ordering cost, instead of the same holding cost. To distinguish the instances,
let Sˆ be the supplier and Rˆ the retailer for the newly constructed problem. We claim that both
instances are equivalent, i.e., both have the same optimal objective value and there is a bijection
between the optimal solutions.
To show any equivalence between instances, the important expressions of the contracting model
are: φS , φ
k
R, and φ
k∗
R . Consider any order quantity xk ∈ R>0 and set xˆk = 1/xk, leading to the
expressions:
φS(xk) = dF
1
xk
+
1
2
H
d
p
xk =
1
2
H
d
p
1
xˆk
+ dF xˆk = dˆFˆ
1
xˆk
+
1
2
Hˆ
dˆ
pˆ
xˆk = φSˆ(xˆk),
φkR(xk) = dfk
1
xk
+
1
2
hxk = dfkxˆk +
1
2
h
1
xˆk
= dˆfˆ
1
xˆk
+
1
2
hˆkxˆk = φ
k
Rˆ
(xˆk),
φk∗R =
√
2dfkh =
√
2dˆfˆ hˆk = φ
k∗
Rˆ
,
where the equalities follow by definition. Thus, any pair (x, z) is a feasible solution for the original
instance if and only if (1/x, z) is feasible for the newly constructed instance. Moreover, the objective
values of the two instances are equal.
To conclude, the qualitative properties of the contracting model with one uncertain cost pa-
rameter are irrespective of which cost parameter (ordering or holding cost) is uncertain.
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2.2 Alternative convex model
The contracting model is not convex, since the IC constraints state:
df
(
1
xk
− 1
xl
)
+
1
2
(hk − hl)xk + zl − zk ≤ 0, ∀ k, l ∈ K.
Here, the term −1/xl is not convex in the decision variables. Non-convex optimisation problems
are generally difficult to solve, but we show that this is not the case for our problem. We reveal
a hidden convexity of our problem by changing the perspective from side payments to so-called
‘information rents’.
An alternative contracting model can be obtained by rescaling the side payments as follows.
The individual rationality constraints imply that zk ≥ φkR(xk)− φk∗R ≥ 0. As such, it is natural to
interpret the value φkR(xk)−φk∗R as the minimum side payment that always has to be paid to satisfy
the IR constraint. We introduce a new variable yk which denotes the additional side payment
required by the IC constraints:
yk = zk − (φkR(xk)− φk∗R ) ≥ 0.
This variable is also known as the information rent for type k. Substituting zk = yk +φ
k
R(xk)−φk∗R
in the default contracting model leads to:
min
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φS(xk) + φ
k
R(xk) + yk − φk∗R
)
,
s.t. yk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K, (2.1)
yl − yk + φlR(xl)− φkR(xl) ≤ φl∗R − φk∗R , ∀ k, l ∈ K, (2.2)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
So, (2.1) are the IR constraints and (2.2) are the IC constraints. We call the new model the
alternative contracting model to differentiate it from the earlier defined default model. By definition
of yk, there is a bijection between the feasible region of the alternative model and that of the default
model. Furthermore, the corresponding objective values are the same. Hence, we can solve the
default model by solving the alternative model and vice versa.
Although both models are equivalent in the sense mentioned above, there is one significant
difference. Notice that the non-linear terms in (2.2) cancel out if we expand the cost functions:
yl − yk + 1
2
(hl − hk)xl = yl − yk + φlR(xl)− φkR(xl) ≤ φl∗R − φk∗R .
Thus, all constraints of the alternative model are linear in the decision variables. Since the objective
function is convex, we conclude that the alternative model is convex. Moreover, the feasible solution
xk = x
k∗
R and yk =  ∈ R>0 for all k ∈ K is a Slater point, i.e., strictly feasible. It is well-known
that a convex model with differentiable functions and Slater points can be solved efficiently using
scalable methods such as interior-point or cutting-plane methods (see Bertsekas 2015; Boyd and
Vandenberghe 2004). This conclusion is stated in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. The contracting model can be solved efficiently via the alternative model.
Proof. The proof is given in the above discussion.
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Remark 2.2. Recalling the results from Section 2.1, we note that the contracting model with single-
dimensional types can be solved efficiently. If both the ordering cost f and the holding cost h are
private information, we have two-dimensional retailer types specified by cost parameters (fk, hk).
In this case, both the default model and the alternative model fall in the category of Difference
of Convex functions (DC) programming. In the literature, there exist good numerical methods to
find local optima of DC models, see Horst et al. 1991; Pham Dinh and Le Thi 2014. However, to
guarantee global optimality such methods need to be incorporated into for example a Branch-and-
Bound procedure. 
To conclude, in practice we can determine optimal solutions of our problem numerically. We
have implemented a cutting-plane algorithm using Gurobi as Linear Programming solver. Typical
computational times are less than a second for one hundred types on a standard desktop computer.
However, it is worthwhile to further analyse the model theoretically. In the following sections we
determine qualitative properties of the optimal menu of contracts and in some cases even provide
closed-form solutions. The used model (default or alternative) has no significant effect on the
results. Hence, we present all results using the default model and place remarks where needed for
the alternative model.
3 Structural properties
We continue with additional properties of the contracting model and its optimal solutions. These
results hold for a general number of retailer types. In particular, the model is connected to a
one-to-all shortest path problem in a certain directed graph. This allows us to use the theory of
the shortest path problem and have a different view of the contracting model. Furthermore, we use
the well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to determine structures in the optimal solution.
In the end, we derive a sufficient condition to guarantee unique contracts in the optimal solution.
Moreover, the analysis leads to a minimal list of menus of contracts for two and three retailer types
which contains the optimal solution. These are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Shortest path interpretation
A closer look into the structure of the IR and IC constraints shows a connection with a dual
shortest path interpretation. For given fixed quantities xk, constraints (1.5) and (1.6) can be seen
as the dual constraints of a shortest path problem. To be specific, for given xk the whole model is
equivalent to the dual of a specific minimum cost flow formulation for the one-to-all shortest path
problem. A similar connection to shortest paths has been described in Vohra 2012.
Consider the directed graph G = (V,A) with nodes V = {s} ∪ K and directed arcs A =
{(s, k) : k ∈ K}∪{(k, l) : k, l ∈ K, k 6= l}. That is, G is the complete graph of K retailer nodes with
a source added. See Figure 1 for an example. We call such a graph an IRIC graph, which stands
for Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility graph for reasons to become apparent.
The lengths (or costs) of the arcs are:
• arc (s, k) with k ∈ K has length φk∗R − φkR(xk),
• arc (k, l) with k, l ∈ K, k 6= l, has length φlR(xk)− φlR(xl).
Finally, node s has supply
∑
k∈K ωk and each retailer node k ∈ K has demand ωk. There are no
capacity restrictions on the arcs. Consequently, flow will be sent along shortest paths in the optimal
solution of the flow formulation. Hence, we see this flow formulation as a one-to-all shortest path
representation.
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34
Figure 1: IRIC graph for K = 4 retailer types.
It is useful to mention some well-known properties of the dual flow formulation, see also Ahuja
et al. 1993. Consider the optimal solution (x, z) of the contracting model. The value −zk is equal
to the length of the shortest (s, k)-path. Moreover, Strong Duality implies that the IRIC graph
contains a negative cycle if and only if the dual is infeasible. In such cases there exist no side
payments that will satisfy the IC constraints for the considered order quantities xk. Thus, the IC
constraints can be satisfied if and only if the corresponding IRIC graph has no negative cycles.
In the non-degenerate case, the set of all used arcs in the optimal shortest paths from s to the
other nodes forms a spanning tree in the IRIC graph. In the degenerate case, this does not hold,
but the optimal solution can be modified such that the used arcs form a spanning tree again. In
particular, if the set contains cycles, these cycles must have length 0.
From the complementary slackness conditions it follows that if arc (i, j) is in the spanning
tree, then the corresponding constraint in the dual is satisfied with equality. For example, if arc
(s, k) is part of the shortest path tree, then the IR constraint for type k is tight. If arc (k, l)
is used, with k, l ∈ K, then type l wants to pretend to be type k. That is, the IC constraint
φlR(xl)− zl ≤ φlR(xk)− zk is satisfied with equality.
Due to the bijection between retailer types and retailer type nodes, and the bijection between
arcs and the IR and IC constraints, we often interchange interpretation and terminology. For
example, we can refer to outgoing arcs out of a retailer type, referring to the outgoing arcs of the
corresponding node in the graph. These insights explain why we call the graph the IRIC graph.
Remark 3.1. We note that the same results hold for the alternative model, with the exception that
the arc lengths are given by:
• arc (s, k) with k ∈ K has length 0,
• arc (k, l) with k, l ∈ K, k 6= l, has length φlR(xk)− φkR(xk) + φk∗R − φl∗R . 
Remark 3.2. Due to personal taste, one can prefer a longest path formulation instead. The arc
lengths are somewhat easier to remember directly from the model by rewriting the IR and IC
constraints to:
zk ≥ φkR(xk)− φk∗R︸ ︷︷ ︸
arc length (s, k)
, zk ≥ zl +
(
φkR(xk)− φkR(xl)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
arc length (l, k)
.
In the optimal solution, zk is the length of the longest path from node s to node k when using these
arc lengths. Naturally, the longest and shortest path formulations are equivalent. 
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3.2 Adjacent retailer types
Since the types are ordered such that h1 < h2 < · · · < hK , there is a sense of adjacent or neigh-
bouring types. We define the neighbours of type k ∈ K to be the types k−1 and k+1, where types
1 and K have only one neighbour. The adjacency of types plays an important role as we will see.
Intuitively, one would expect that in an optimal solution a type with higher holding cost gets
offered a lower order quantity (i.e., more frequent orderings) to prevent too high inventory costs.
Lemma 3.3 shows that this intuition is mathematically correct.
Lemma 3.3. Any feasible menu of contracts satisfies x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xK .
Proof. Consider a feasible menu of contracts (x, z). From the shortest path interpretation in Sec-
tion 3.1 we know that no negative cycles exist in the corresponding IRIC graph. In particular, any
2-cycle in the IRIC graph has non-negative length. Without loss of generality, consider i, j ∈ K with
hi < hj and consider the length of the 2-cycle between nodes i and j, which must be non-negative:(
φiR(xj)− φiR(xi)
)
+
(
φjR(xi)− φjR(xj)
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ 12(hj − hi)(xi − xj) ≥ 0
(hi<hj)⇐⇒ xi − xj ≥ 0.
Hence, xi ≥ xj must hold in any feasible solution.
The ordering (or monotonicity) in the order quantities is a common property of contracting
models, see for example Laffont and Martimort 2002; Vohra 2012. However, there is no monotonicity
in the side payments (see Section 4 for examples).
A consequence of Lemma 3.3 is that adjacent retailer types follow both from the holding costs
and from the (feasible) order quantities. In fact, using this result we can restrict the incentive
compatibility constraints to take only the neighbouring types into account, without changing the
feasible region. See Lemma 3.4 for the result. We call these constraints the adjacent IC constraints.
Lemma 3.4. The adjacent incentive compatibility constraints are sufficient to ensure general in-
centive compatibility.
Proof. Let (x, z) be the optimal menu of contracts when we only use the adjacent IC constraints,
instead of all general IC constraints. Consider a cycle C = (i1, . . . , iC) of unique retailer nodes in
the IRIC graph corresponding to (x, z). We prove that any such cycle has non-negative length,
implying that all general IC constraints are satisfied. The proof is by induction on the cardinality
of C.
If C = 2, then the adjacent IC constraints enforce that the cycle length is non-negative. There-
fore, let C > 2 and without loss of generality, assume that type iC has the greatest holding cost.
By induction, the cycle (i1, . . . , iC−1) has non-negative length. We compare the difference in length
between the two cycles, see also Figure 2:((
φiCR (xiC−1)− φiCR (xiC )
)
+
(
φi1R(xiC )− φi1R(xi1)
))
−
(
φi1R(xiC−1)− φi1R(xi1)
)
= φiCR (xiC−1)− φiCR (xiC ) + φi1R(xiC )− φi1R(xiC−1)
= 12(hiC − hi1)(xiC−1 − xiC ) ≥ 0.
The inequality follows from our assumptions on the holding costs (hiC > hi1) and Lemma 3.3.
Thus, C must have non-negative length as well. Consequently, all IC constraints hold without
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explicitly incorporating the corresponding IC constraints in the optimisation model. To conclude,
(x, z) is also optimal for the complete contracting model with all general IC constraints.
i1
. . .
iC−1
iC
i1
. . .
iC−1
iC
(a) Smaller cycle (i1, . . . , iC−1).
i1
. . .
iC−1
iC
i1
. . .
iC−1
iC
(b) Larger cycle C = (i1, . . . , iC).
Figure 2: Relevant arcs in the induction proof of Lemma 3.4.
We can use Lemma 3.4 to prove that order quantities satisfying x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xK > 0
can always be extended to a feasible menu of contracts (x, z), see Corollary 3.5. Therefore, we
sometimes call such order quantities feasible for the contracting model.
Corollary 3.5. For given order quantities satisfying x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xK > 0, it is feasible and
optimal to determine the side payments via the shortest path interpretation.
Proof. From Lemma 3.4 it follows that for feasibility we only need to determine side payments
such that the adjacent IC constraints are satisfied. From the shortest path interpretation, we
know that side payments satisfying the adjacent IC constraints exist if and only if 2-cycles in the
corresponding graph have non-negative length. Now consider arbitrary i, j ∈ K with hi < hj . The
proof of Lemma 3.3 shows that the 2-cycle between i and j has non-negative length if and only if
xi ≥ xj , which holds by assumption.
Hence, we can determine feasible side payments by solving a one-to-all shortest path problem
as described in Section 3.1. Furthermore, this leads to the best possible feasible side payments with
respect to the given order quantities.
3.3 KKT conditions
Since the contracting model consists of continuously differentiable functions with a continuous
domain, there are well-known necessary conditions for optimality and even sufficient optimality
conditions in certain cases. Using these conditions we can design candidate solutions for further
inspection. This allows us to analytically investigate properties of the optimal menu of contracts.
In the following sections we use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to do so.
First of all, we point out a subtle issue regarding KKT conditions. The default contracting
model is non-convex. As such, the general KKT conditions, also known as Fritz-John conditions,
(see Brinkhuis and Tikhomirov 2005; John 1948), are necessary for the optimal solution. We need
regularity conditions to be able to use the standard KKT conditions (Karush 1939; Kuhn and
Tucker 1951), such as the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification.
However, with a slight detour we can ignore this issue. We have an equivalent convex model
with a Slater point, namely the alternative contracting model of Section 2.2. Thus, the standard
KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for the alternative model. Both models lead to the
same general KKT conditions, from which we conclude that the standard KKT conditions are also
necessary and sufficient for the default model.
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The KKT conditions lead to a (large) set of candidate solutions. These solutions will be called
KKT menus and their contracts KKT contracts. The optimal solution of our model is the best
KKT menu. However, in general determining this set will be intractable due to its size. Therefore,
we analyse our problem to exclude certain KKT menus. Unfortunately, we do not end up with
a tractable solution approach for a general number of retailer types. Hence, this KKT approach
seems unsuccessful to provide a generalisable solution method, but the analysis will nevertheless
provide additional insight in optimal menus of contracts.
With the above mentioned remarks in mind, we determine the general KKT conditions for the
contracting model. Using Lemma 3.4 we only incorporate the adjacent IC constraints in our model.
The Lagrangian function with Lagrange multipliers κ ∈ R≥0, λ, ν ∈ RK≥0, and µ ∈ R2K−2≥0 is given
by:
L(x, z, κ, λ, µ, ν) = κ
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) +
∑
k∈K
λk
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φk∗R
)
+
∑
k∈K\{1}
µk−1,k
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φkR(xk−1) + zk−1
)
+
∑
k∈K\{K}
µk+1,k
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φkR(xk+1) + zk+1
)
+
∑
k∈K
νk(−xk).
We deliberately choose this order of the indices of µ and will explain in Section 3.4 why this notation
is useful.
The KKT conditions consist of primal and dual feasibility, complementary slackness, and sta-
tionarity constraints. The dual feasibility constraints require all multipliers to be non-negative with
the additional condition that not all multipliers are zero. The complementary slackness constraints
are:
λk
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φk∗R
)
= 0, ∀ k ∈ K,
µk−1,k
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φkR(xk−1) + zk−1
)
= 0, ∀ k ∈ K \ {1},
µk+1,k
(
φkR(xk)− zk − φkR(xk+1) + zk+1
)
= 0, ∀ k ∈ K \ {K},
νkxk = 0, ∀ k ∈ K. (3.1)
Since xk = 0 is never optimal, it follows from (3.1) that νk = 0 for all k ∈ K. Therefore, we
set νk = 0 and ignore related terms completely. Likewise, we argued above that the standard KKT
conditions hold, implying that κ = 1. Thus, we ignore this multiplier as well.
For each k ∈ K, the stationarity constraints with respect to xk are:
ωk
dφS
dx
(xk) + λk
dφkR
dx
(xk) + (µk−1,k + µk+1,k)
dφkR
dx
(xk)
− µk,k−1
dφk−1R
dx
(xk)− µk,k+1
dφk+1R
dx
(xk) = 0, (3.2)
and with respect to zk:
ωk − λk − (µk−1,k + µk+1,k) + (µk,k−1 + µk,k+1) = 0, (3.3)
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where all ill-defined multipliers with out of bound indices are set to zero. We can simplify the
stationarity constraints by substituting (3.3) in (3.2):
ωk
(
−d(f + F )
x2k
+
1
2
(
hk +H
d
p
))
+
1
2
µk,k−1(hk − hk−1) + 1
2
µk,k+1(hk − hk+1) = 0. (3.4)
To conclude, the KKT conditions consist of the primal and dual feasibility constraints, comple-
mentary slackness constraints, and stationarity constraints (3.3) and (3.4).
Remark 3.6. The KKT conditions for the alternative model directly give (3.3) and (3.4). 
3.4 KKT graph
As mentioned before, we only use adjacent IC constraints (Lemma 3.4). The shortest path inter-
pretation of Section 3.1 still holds and the corresponding Adjacent IRIC graph is shown in Figure 3.
Notice that the order of indices of µ corresponds nicely to the Adjacent IRIC graph. If µlk > 0, then
the equality φkR(xk)− zk = φkR(xl)− zl must hold by the KKT complementary slackness conditions.
Hence, arc (l, k) is used by the shortest paths, as discussed in Section 3.1. The same holds for λk,
constraint φkR(xk)− zk ≤ φk∗R , and arc (s, k). Consequently, we have bijections between multipliers
λ (or µ), the IR (or IC) constraints, and certain arcs in the Adjacent IRIC graph. As such, we can
refer to the multiplier of an arc in the Adjacent IRIC graph.
Thus, the strictly positive multipliers indicate which arcs are for certain part of shortest paths
in the IRIC graph. Unfortunately, there could be arcs in a shortest path for which the multiplier
is zero, as degenerate cases may occur.
s
1 2 3 4
Figure 3: Adjacent IRIC graph for K = 4 types.
Each KKT menu can be identified by the subset of multipliers which are strictly positive. We
can visualise the contract in the Adjacent IRIC graph by only considering the arcs for which the
corresponding multipliers are strictly positive. That is, we have a directed graph Gˆ = (V, Aˆ) with
V = {s} ∪ K and arcs
• (s, k) with k ∈ K if λk > 0,
• (k, k − 1) with k ∈ K \ {1} if µk,k−1 > 0,
• (k, k + 1) with k ∈ K \ {K} if µk,k+1 > 0.
We call this graph the KKT graph. In the results to come, we often use the term ‘connected
component’ of the KKT graph. To avoid confusion, a subset S ⊆ V is a connected component if
between each pair of nodes in S there exists an undirected path in the graph. Furthermore, a node
is called isolated if it has no (in- or outgoing) arcs.
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The KKT graph allows for easy-to-draw names of KKT menus. We call arc (s, k) the Up arc
for retailer type k ∈ K, arc (k, k + 1) the Right arc, and arc (k, k − 1) the Left arc. The name of a
KKT menu is simply a list of the Up, Right, and Left arcs of the corresponding KKT graph. For
example, KKT menu 1Right2UpLeft3UpLeftRight4x is shown in Figure 4.
s
2 3 41
Figure 4: KKT graph for 1Right2UpLeft3UpLeftRight4x.
3.5 Properties of optimal contracts
The result that only adjacent IC constraints need to be taken into account greatly reduces the
number of possible KKT menus to consider. We continue to analyse which cases can also be
excluded from consideration, i.e., which combinations of strictly positive multipliers (or which
KKT graphs) can occur. We start with Lemma 3.7, which shows an explicit connection to shortest
paths.
Lemma 3.7. Every retailer node k ∈ K must be reachable from source node s in the KKT graph.
Proof. First, suppose k ∈ K has no ingoing arcs, i.e., λk = µk−1,k = µk+1,k = 0. From (3.3) we
have:
ωk + µk,k−1 + µk,k+1 = 0 =⇒ µk,k−1 + µk,k+1 < 0.
This contradicts the fact that all multipliers are non-negative. Hence, any node in K must have an
ingoing arc.
Second, let S = {i, i+ 1, . . . , j− 1, j} ⊆ K be an arbitrary maximal connected subset of retailer
nodes with λk = 0 for all k ∈ S. That is, no node in S is directly reachable from node s. Adding
up (3.3) for all k ∈ S results in:∑
k∈S
ωk − µi−1,i − µj+1,j + µi,i−1 + µj,j+1 = 0. (3.5)
Notice that all internal arcs of S cancel out. Furthermore, by maximality of the subset, all remaining
multipliers in (3.5) must be zero. This leads to a contradiction, since ωk > 0 for all k ∈ K. To
conclude, every maximal connected component is reachable from s.
Finally, by iteratively using that each node has an ingoing arc we can conclude that every node
must be reachable from node s.
Notice that this is a stronger property than the fact that the side payments follow from shortest
paths. Shortest paths imply that each node is reachable from s using only arcs for which the
corresponding constraint is tight. As weak complementary slackness may hold, tightness does
not automatically imply that the corresponding multiplier is strictly positive. However, a strictly
positive multiplier does imply tightness of the constraint. This result allows us to discard certain
combinations of multipliers, significantly reducing the number of options.
The next lemma describes a general pattern (a ‘T-pattern’) that will never occur in the optimal
solution.
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Lemma 3.8. There exist no k ∈ K \ {1,K} such that the constraints corresponding to arcs (s, k),
(k, k − 1), and (k, k + 1) are satisfied with equality.
Proof. Let i, j, k ∈ K, i < k < j, be such that the constraints corresponding to arcs (s, k), (k, i),
and (k, j) are satisfied with equality. Consequently, we have:
φkR(xk)− zk = φk∗R ,
φiR(xi)− zi = φiR(xk)− zk, φjR(xj)− zj = φjR(xk)− zk,
φiR(xi)− zi ≤ φi∗R , φjR(xj)− zj ≤ φj∗R .
Combining these relations leads to the following:
φi∗R ≥ φiR(xi)− zi = φiR(xk)− zk = φiR(xk)− φkR(xk) + φk∗R
= 12(hi − hk)xk + φk∗R ,
φj∗R ≥ φjR(xj)− zj = φjR(xk)− zk = φjR(xk)− φkR(xk) + φk∗R
= 12(hj − hk)xk + φk∗R .
Rewriting these results gives:
φi∗R − φk∗R
hi − hk ≤
1
2xk ≤
φj∗R − φk∗R
hj − hk .
Recall that φl∗R =
√
2dfhl for all l ∈ K. Thus, we arrive at the following inequality:
√
hk −
√
hi
hk − hi ≤
√
hj −
√
hk
hj − hk ⇐⇒
1√
hk +
√
hi
≤ 1√
hj +
√
hk
⇐⇒
√
hi ≥
√
hj .
The first inequality compares two slopes between three points on the square root curve. Such an
inequality never holds for hi < hk < hj , as the equivalent inequality shows.
Corollary 3.9. A retailer node directly connected to node s in the KKT graph has at most one
outgoing arc.
Proof. Suppose a node k ∈ K directly connected to s has more outgoing arcs. The direct connection
to node s implies λk > 0. Furthermore, the outgoing arcs must be (k, k − 1) and (k, k + 1), so
µk,k−1, µk,k+1 > 0. The KKT complementary slackness conditions imply that the corresponding
constraints are tight, violating Lemma 3.8.
Corollary 3.9 implies that the graph in Figure 4 is never a valid KKT graph, since node 3 has
Up, Left, and Right arcs (violating the corollary).
3.5.1 Cycles are restrictive
As a result of Lemma 3.4, the only cycles of interest are 2-cycles between adjacent nodes. The next
lemma and corollary show that 2-cycles lead to having the same contract, also called ‘bunching’ in
the literature.
Lemma 3.10. Both incentive compatibility constraints between (adjacent) retailer types i and j
are tight if and only if xi = xj. Furthermore, if xi = xj then zi = zj must hold.
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Proof. First, suppose the order quantities for types i, j ∈ K are the same. The incentive compati-
bility constraints state:
φiR(xi)− zi ≤ φiR(xj)− zj = φiR(xi)− zj ⇐⇒ zi ≥ zj ,
φjR(xj)− zj ≤ φjR(xi)− zi = φjR(xj)− zi ⇐⇒ zj ≥ zi.
Thus, zi = zj must hold and both contracts are the same. Consequently, substituting zi = zj shows
that both incentive compatibility constraints are tight.
Second, suppose both incentive compatibility constraints between i and j are tight:
φiR(xi)− zi = φiR(xj)− zj , φjR(xj)− zj = φjR(xi)− zi.
Combining both equalities leads to:
φiR(xi)− φjR(xi) = φiR(xj)− φjR(xj) ⇐⇒ 12(hi − hj)xi = 12(hi − hj)xj ⇐⇒ xi = xj .
The first equivalence follows from having the same ordering cost f and the last equivalence from
hi 6= hj . As proved above, xi = xj implies that zi = zj . Thus, the contracts for types i and j are
the same.
Corollary 3.11. Types part of a 2-cycle in the KKT graph have the same contract.
Proof. Being part of a 2-cycle in the KKT graph means that µkl, µlk > 0 for some adjacent k, l ∈ K.
From complementary slackness it follows that both incentive compatibility constraints between
types k and l must be tight. Lemma 3.10 implies that xk = xl and zk = zl.
The KKT conditions become more restrictive if certain types have the same order quantity, as
it introduces additional dependency between the decision variables. Using this fact, we can exclude
more cases from consideration, see Lemma 3.12.
Lemma 3.12. In the KKT graph, a maximal subset of retailer nodes connected with only 2-cycles
must have at least one ingoing arc (possibly from node s) and exactly one outgoing arc.
Proof. The statement that at least one ingoing arc exists follows directly from Lemma 3.7. We
prove the statement for the outgoing arcs by contradiction.
Let S = {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, j} ⊆ K be such a maximal subset and suppose that S as a whole
has no outgoings arcs. By Corollary 3.11, all k ∈ S get the same contract, say order quantity x.
The stationarity conditions state that
ωk
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x2
+
1
2
(
hk +H
d
p
))
+
1
2
µk,k−1(hk − hk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
1
2
µk,k+1(hk − hk+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
= 0.
By assumption, µi,i−1 = 0 or non-existent (if i = 1). Likewise, µj,j+1 = 0 or non-existent (if j = K).
The stationarity constraint for type i requires that:(
−d(f + F ) 1
x2
+
1
2
(
hi +H
d
p
))
> 0.
This implies that the similar term in the stationarity constraint for j is also strictly positive, as
hi < hj . However, the resulting constraint only contains strictly positive terms, which is infeasible.
Thus, S as a whole has at least one outgoing arc.
Suppose S as a whole has two outgoing arcs, i.e., µi,i−1, µj,j+1 > 0. By Lemma 3.7, all nodes
in S must be reachable from s via arcs with strictly positive multipliers. Corollary 3.9 implies that
λi, . . . , λj = 0, otherwise the solution is infeasible. Therefore, µi−1,i > 0 and/or µj+1,j > 0 must
hold, but this contradicts the maximality of S. To conclude, S has exactly one outgoing arc.
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For example, the graph in Figure 4 is not a valid KKT graph, since nodes 1 and 2 form a 2-cycle
but do not have an outgoing arc.
A direct consequence is that for two retailer types KKT graphs with 2-cycles are not valid KKT
graphs. For more than two retailer types 2-cycles in the optimal solution can actually occur, see
Section 4. This implies that types can get the same contract in the optimal solution. We return to
this issue in Section 3.6.
3.5.2 The joint order quantity
If a retailer node k ∈ K has no outgoing arcs in the KKT graph it is straightforward to determine
that xk = x
k∗
J must hold. The next lemma shows that this is an if-and-only-if relation.
Lemma 3.13. In the optimal solution, xk = x
k∗
J if and only if node k ∈ K has no outgoing arcs in
the KKT graph.
Proof. First, suppose node k ∈ K has no outgoing arcs in the KKT graph, i.e., µk,k−1 = µk,k+1 = 0.
The KKT stationarity condition (3.4) requires that:
ωk
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x2k
+
1
2
(
hk +H
d
p
))
= 0 =⇒ xk = xk∗J ,
which proves one direction of the lemma.
Second, suppose that xk = x
k∗
J . Again using the KKT stationarity condition (3.4), we get:
µk,k−1(hk − hk−1) + µk,k+1(hk − hk+1) = 0.
Since hk−1 < hk < hk+1, either µk,k−1, µk,k+1 > 0 (node k has two outgoing arcs) or µk,k−1 =
µk,k+1 = 0 (node k has no outgoing arcs). In the latter case we are done. Therefore, suppose
µk,k−1, µk,k+1 > 0. We discern two cases.
Case I: node k is not part of a 2-cycle, i.e., µk−1,k = µk+1,k = 0. By Lemma 3.7 node k must
be reachable from node s, implying λk > 0. This case is infeasible, see Corollary 3.9.
Case II: node k is part of a 2-cycle. Let k be part of the maximal subset S = {i, i +
1, . . . , k, . . . , j−1, j} ⊆ K of retailer nodes connected with 2-cycles. Recall that from Corollary 3.11
we know that all types in S have the same contract. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.12 either µi,i−1 > 0
or µj,j+1 > 0 (but not both).
Consider the case that µi,i−1 > 0, and thus µj,j+1 = 0 and j > k. The KKT stationarity
conditions state:
ωj
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x2j
+
1
2
(
hj +H
d
p
))
+
1
2
µj,j−1(hj − hj−1) = 0.
Since µj,j−1(hj − hj−1) > 0, it must hold that xj < xj∗J . Since xk = xj , we have the required
contradiction:
xk∗J = xk = xj < x
j∗
J < x
k∗
J .
The other case, µi,i−1 = 0 and µj,j+1 > 0, is similar and is omitted.
To conclude, if xk = x
k∗
J node k must have no outgoing arcs in the KKT graph, which completes
the proof.
Our last result for this section, Lemma 3.14, states that at least one type is assigned the joint
order quantity in the optimal solution.
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Lemma 3.14. In the optimal solution the order quantity for at least one retailer type is the joint
order quantity. Moreover, the total costs for at least one retailer type equals its default costs.
Proof. The result that there exists a retailer type with the same total costs as its default option
follows directly from Lemma 3.7. That is, there exists a k ∈ K such that λk > 0. Hence, φkR(xk)−
zk = φ
k∗
R by complementary slackness.
By combining Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13, we can prove the other claim as follows. Suppose each
retailer node has an outgoing arc in the KKT graph. Thus, arc (1, 2) from type 1 to type 2 exists
in the graph. If arc (2, 3) is in the graph, we continue to type 3. If type 2 has only outgoing arc
(2, 1), then type 2 forms a 2-cycle with type 1. By Lemma 3.12 arc (2, 3) must exist as well, a
contradiction. Repeat this argument until we reach type K. Since node K also has an outgoing
arc, a 2-cycle with type K − 1 is formed. Again by Lemma 3.12, this cycle must have an outgoing
arc, namely arc (K − 1,K − 2). Repeat this argument until we reach type 1. Hence, all retailer
nodes are part of 2-cycles which contradicts Lemma 3.12.
Thus, there exists at least one type with no outgoing arcs. Lemma 3.13 states that this retailer
type is assigned the joint order quantity in the optimal solution.
3.6 Uniqueness of contracts
Additional assumptions are needed in order to guarantee that the optimal menu of contracts
uniquely identifies each type, i.e., that each contract in the menu is unique. Suppose that the
supplier only has bounds for the retailer’s holding cost, h ∈ [hLB, hUB], and due to the lack of
information assumes a uniform distribution for h. We discretise the uniform distribution using
K ∈ N equidistant points: h ∈ {h1, . . . , hK} with hk+1 = hk + δ for some appropriate step δ ∈ R>0.
Furthermore, the uniform distribution implies that all weights are equal, ωk = ω for all k ∈ K.
The assumptions lead to the following KKT stationarity conditions for k ∈ K:(
−2d(f + F )
x2k
+H dp
)
+ hk + δ(µk,k−1 − µk,k+1) = 0, (3.6)
1− λk − µk−1,k − µk+1,k + µk,k−1 + µk,k+1 = 0, (3.7)
where all ill-defined multipliers with out of bound indices are set to zero. Notice that without loss
of generality we set ωk = 1 in the KKT conditions by uniformly rescaling all multipliers.
It turns out that uniformity on types and equidistant holding costs is sufficient to guarantee
a priori to obtain an optimal menu with unique contracts, see Theorem 3.15. Be aware that the
exclusion of 2-cycles of arcs with strictly positive multipliers does not automatically imply that all
contracts are unique, at least not without improving the result of Corollary 3.11.
Theorem 3.15. Assume uniformity on types and equidistant holding costs. In the optimal solution,
all contracts are unique.
Proof. For all types k ∈ K, let ωk = ω and hk+1 = hk + δ for some δ ∈ R>0. First, realise that
if xk = xl for some l > k + 1, then all intermediate types also have the same order quantity:
xk = xk+1 = · · · = xl−1 = xl. This follows from the ordering of the order quantities (Lemma 3.3).
Second, if xk = xl then automatically zk = zl must hold to be feasible (Lemma 3.10). So, both
contracts are exactly the same.
Assume that there are contracts for retailer types that are the same, else there is nothing to
prove. Let S = {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, j} ⊆ K with i < j be a maximal set of types with the same
contract. Note that Lemma 3.8 implies that λi+1, . . . , λj−1 = 0. We have to distinguish two cases
based on the KKT multipliers.
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Case I: µi,i−1 > 0. We have three direct implications: λi = 0 (by Lemma 3.8), µi−1,i = 0 (by
maximality of S and Corollary 3.11), and thus µi+1,i > 0 (by Lemma 3.7). Furthermore, since all
nodes in S must be reachable (Lemma 3.7), we have that µi+1,i, . . . , µj,j−1 > 0. Finally, we can
conclude that µj,j+1 = 0 with a simple argument by contradiction using the maximality of S or
Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8.
Now we can derive two contradictory equations. The first equation is as follows. Since
λi, . . . , λj−1 = 0, the sum of the corresponding KKT conditions (3.7) from i to j − 1 is equal
to
(j − i− 1) + µi,i−1 − µj,j−1 + µj−1,j = 0.
For the second equation we need to consider the KKT conditions (3.6) for type i and j. As xi = xj
both conditions have a common part, hence the difference must be equal:
hi + δ(µi,i−1 − µi,i+1) = hj + δµj,j−1 ⇐⇒ µi,i−1 − µi,i+1 = (j − i) + µj,j−1.
Finally, both equations combined state that
−µi,i+1 = 2(j − i)− 1 + µj−1,j ≥ 1 + µj−1,j > 0.
This contradicts that µi+1,i is non-negative.
Case II: µi,i−1 = 0. The KKT stationarity for type i simplifies to(
−2d(f + F )
x2i
+H dp
)
+ hi = δµi,i+1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, for any k ∈ S, k > i, it must hold that µk,k+1 > 0, since xk = xi and from the above
inequality:
0 =
(
−2d(f + F )
x2k
+H dp
)
+ hk + δ(µk,k−1 − µk,k+1) ≥ (hk − hi) + δ(µk,k−1 − µk,k+1).
Consequently, λj = 0 by Lemma 3.8, and µj+1,j = 0 by maximality of S and Corollary 3.11.
As in Case I, we derive two contradictory equations. The sum of the corresponding KKT
conditions (3.7) from i+ 1 to j is equal to
(j − i− 1) + µi+1,i − µi,i+1 + µj,j+1 = 0.
The KKT conditions (3.6) for type i and j lead to:
hi − δµi,i+1 = hj + δ(µj,j−1 − µj,j+1) ⇐⇒ −µi,i+1 = (j − i) + µj,j−1 − µj,j+1.
These two equations give a contradiction:
0 = 2(j − i)− 1 + µj,j−1 + µi+1,i ≥ 1.
To conclude, a menu with non-unique contracts between retailer types is never optimal, irre-
spective of the actual value of δ. This shows that uniformity of types and equidistant holding costs
are sufficient for unique contracts.
Corollary 3.16. If we assume uniformity on types and equidistant holding costs, the KKT graph
has no cycles.
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Proof. Suppose the KKT graph has a 2-cycle (which are the only cycles possible). Corollary 3.11
implies that those two types have the same contract, which contradicts Theorem 3.15.
If we remove one of the two assumptions, there are instances where the optimal menu does not
have unique contracts. Table 2 provides such examples where the optimal solution has non-unique
contracts. Notice that there are no examples with only two retailer types. In the next section, we
will prove in Theorem 4.1 that the optimal menu for two types always has unique contracts.
Optimal Menu F H f h1 h2 h3 Objective x1 z1 x2 z2 x3 z3
1x 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 5 9 10 6.179 510 077 0.816 497 0.154 678 0.544 331 0.086 637 0.544 331 0.086 637
1Up 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 4 9 10 6.026 932 378 0.894 427 0.078 461 0.547 903 0.092 520 0.547 903 0.092 520
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3x 1 5 6 1 2 6 16.017 368 801 2 0.535 898 2 0.535 898 1.128 152 0.238 786
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3Up 1 4 9 1 2 6 15.694 403 017 2.459 866 0.646 029 2.459 866 0.646 029 1.414 214 0.214 297
(a) Examples for K = 3 with unconstrained holding costs, unit rates (d = p = 1), and unit weights
(ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 1).
Optimal Menu F H f h1 h2 h3 Objective x1 z1 x2 z2 x3 z3
1x 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 3 4 5 35.106 395 133 1 0.053 004 0.715 282 0.023 977 0.715 282 0.023 977
1Up 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 3 5 7 36.825 868 698 1 0.050 510 0.646 084 0.067 423 0.646 084 0.067 423
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3x 1 3 7 1 2 3 84.397 091 826 2.708 013 0.197 270 2.708 013 0.197 270 1.632 993 0.286 427
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3Up 1 3 1 1 2 3 52.964 992 389 1.035 276 0.069 350 1.035 276 0.069 350 0.816 497 0
(b) Examples for K = 3 with equidistant holding costs, unit rates (d = p = 1), and weights ω1 = 10, ω2 = 1,
ω3 = 10.
Table 2: Examples of non-unique contracts in the optimal solution for three retailer types.
4 Optimal menus of contracts
The KKT conditions lead to a list of candidate solutions, one of which is the optimal solution. The
analysis of the KKT conditions excludes certain KKT menus from consideration, which allows us
to focus on the remaining cases. When determining formulas for these KKT menus, we can often
reuse parts of the solution of subproblems or symmetric cases. We have determined the formulas
for all KKT menus for two and three retailer types. These lists of KKT menus are minimal, i.e., if
we omit any menu there are instances for which we would fail to determine the optimum.
In the next sections, we provide and discuss example instances and their optimal KKT menu
for two and three retailer types. These instances have been solved by determining the best KKT
menu, which are derived in Appendices B.2 and B.3. As a verification step, all instances have also
been solved using a cutting-plane procedure (see Section 2). Furthermore, to check the minimality
of the lists of KKT menus, we have verified that exactly one KKT menu is optimal.
4.1 Two retailer types
From our analysis we can reduce the number of KKT menus significantly if there are only two
retailer types (K = 2). From the 24 = 16 cases, there remain 5 cases that can occur, see Figure 5.
The details of the derivation of the corresponding KKT menus are given in Appendix B.2. All 5
KKT menus can be optimal, see Table 3 for example instances and their optimal solution. We
conclude that our analysis is tight for K = 2, i.e., we cannot exclude any of these KKT menus.
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Figure 5: All KKT graphs for two retailer types.
Optimal Menu F H f h1 h2 Objective x1 z1 x2 z2
1x 2UpLeft 2 1 1 1 2 4.363 081 101 1.732 051 0.055 748 1.224 745 0.041 241
1Up 2Up 1 1 1 1 2 2.878 315 178 1.414 214 0 1.154 701 0.020 726
1Up 2UpLeft 1 1 1 2 4 3.120 955 865 1.154 701 0.020 726 0.828 427 0.035 534
1UpRight 2x 1 2 4 1 2 5.139 837 026 2.236 068 0.078 461 1.581 139 0.164 500
1UpRight 2Up 1 1 4 1 2 3.125 827 677 2.343 146 0.050 253 1.825 742 0.016 632
Table 3: Example instances for two retailer types with unit rates and weights.
Although the KKT approach is viable for two retailer types, there is a faster and easier solution
approach. Theorem 4.1 provides closed-form formulas for the optimal menu of contracts in this
case. The theorem shows that the contracts for the types are unique (i.e., not the same) and that
each order quantity lies between the default and joint order quantity for that type. These properties
do not hold in general for three or more types, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4.1. For two retailer types (K = 2) the unique optimal menu of contracts is given by:
x1 = min
{√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
,max
{
2
√
2df√
h1 +
√
h2
,
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
}}
,
x2 = max
{√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω1
ω2
(h2 − h1)
,min
{
2
√
2df√
h1 +
√
h2
,
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
}}
,
z1 = df
1
x1
+
1
2
h1x1 −
√
2dfh1 + max
{
0,
√
2df(
√
h1 −
√
h2) +
1
2
(h2 − h1)x2
}
,
z2 = df
1
x2
+
1
2
h2x2 −
√
2dfh2 + max
{
0,
√
2df(
√
h2 −
√
h1) +
1
2
(h1 − h2)x1
}
,
where we ignore any imaginary values if h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2) < 0.
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Furthermore, we have that x1 > x2 and that each order quantity xk lies in the closed interval
with endpoints xk∗R and x
k∗
J . Finally, xk = x
k∗
R if and only if x
∗
S = x
k∗
R , which implies x
k∗
J = x
k∗
R .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
The closed-form formulas and properties in Theorem 4.1 for the optimal menu of contracts can
be determined relatively easily using only calculus for differentiable convex functions. So there is
no need to evaluate multiple menus or even use KKT conditions to determine the optimal solution.
4.2 Three retailer types
For three retailer types (K = 3) our results reduce the number of KKT menus from 27 = 128
to only 23. For the details we refer to Appendix B.3. For each of the 23 KKT menus, we have
found instances where that menu is optimal. We conclude that our analysis is tight for K = 3. See
Table 4 for example instances and their optimal solution. Observe that such examples can already
be found in a small integer range for the cost parameters.
The analysis and these examples show certain structures in the optimal solution that do not
occur in related literature. For example, Voigt and Inderfurth 2011 study multiple retailer types,
but due to their cost functions only the KKT graph in Figure 6a occurs. For our model, many
more possible optimal structures exist, which complicates the analysis.
Furthermore, in certain optima the same contract is offered to multiple types: see menus with
cycles in their KKT graph, such as in Figure 6b. We also draw additional attention to the solution
corresponding to Figure 6c. Here, type 2 wants to lie having either lower holding cost h1 or higher
cost h3. As a final note, there is no monotonicity or general ordering in the side payments.
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Figure 6: Example KKT graphs for three retailer types that occur in optimal solutions.
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Optimal Menu F H f h1 h2 h3 Objective x1 z1 x2 z2 x3 z3
1x 2UpLeft 3Up 1 1 1 3 4 20 6.082 721 306 1 0.079 821 0.816 497 0.029 311 0.436 436 0.331 090
1x 2UpLeft 3UpLeft 1 1 1 3 4 6 5.149 148 707 1 0.079 821 0.816 497 0.029 311 0.635 674 0.016 054
1x 2Left 3UpLeft 1 1 1 3 4 5 5.069 000 755 1 0.099 524 0.816 497 0.049 014 0.707 107 0.019 703
1x 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 5 9 10 6.179 510 077 0.816 497 0.154 678 0.544 331 0.086 637 0.544 331 0.086 637
1Up 2x 3UpLeft 1 1 1 1 3 4 4.656 338 798 1.414 214 0 1 0.079 821 0.816 497 0.029 311
1Up 2Up 3Up 1 1 1 1 2 9 4.960 229 811 1.414 214 0 1.154 701 0.020 726 0.632 456 0.184 548
1Up 2Up 3UpLeft 1 1 1 1 2 3 4.451 529 277 1.414 214 0 1.154 701 0.020 726 0.898 979 0.011 352
1Up 2UpLeft 3Up 1 1 2 3 4 8 4.605 022 879 1.224 745 0.006 009 1.071 797 0.009 619 0.816 497 0.058 622
1Up 2UpLeft 3UpLeft 1 1 1 2 3 5 4.819 285 508 1.154 701 0.020 726 0.898 979 0.011 352 0.712 788 0.022 634
1Up 2UpRight 3x 1 3 6 1 8 9 9.216 936 179 1.870 829 0.678 448 1.183 216 0.005 830 1.080 123 0.025 909
1Up 2UpRight 3Up 1 1 7 1 3 4 4.895 439 736 2.828 427 0.147 430 2.005 148 0.017 995 1.788 854 0.007 513
1Up 2Left 3UpLeft 1 1 1 2 3 4 4.742 532 117 1.154 701 0.020 726 0.898 482 0.011 470 0.758 372 0.006 931
1Up 2LeftRight 3UpLeft 1 1 1 4 9 10 6.026 932 378 0.894 427 0.078 461 0.547 903 0.092 520 0.547 903 0.092 520
1UpRight 2x 3Up 1 2 3 1 2 5 6.763 963 962 2 0.050 510 1.414 214 0.086 044 1.069 045 0.001 630
1UpRight 2x 3UpLeft 1 6 1 1 7 8 10.836 135 802 0.775 694 0.262 802 0.554 700 0.002 932 0.517 411 0.002 344
1UpRight 2Up 3Up 1 1 3 1 2 3 4.400 022 554 2.029 224 0.043 520 1.632 993 0.006 009 1.414 214 0
1UpRight 2Up 3UpLeft 1 5 1 1 6 7 9.845 849 029 0.819 955 0.215 343 0.603 023 0.003 279 0.555 112 0.002 673
1UpRight 2UpRight 3x 1 2 5 1 2 3 7.859 316 091 2.619 717 0.056 184 2 0.027 864 1.549 193 0.079 140
1UpRight 2UpRight 3Up 1 1 5 1 2 3 4.726 682 033 2.619 717 0.056 184 2.010 179 0.025 384 1.732 051 0.007 602
1UpRight 2Right 3x 1 3 3 1 2 3 9.236 588 251 2 0.050 510 1.414 214 0.086 044 1.154 701 0.173 530
1UpRight 2Right 3Up 1 2 4 1 2 5 7.181 899 382 2.239 120 0.077 549 1.584 379 0.161 041 1.195 229 0.010 156
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3x 1 5 6 1 2 6 16.017 368 801 2 0.535 898 2 0.535 898 1.128 152 0.238 786
1UpRight 2LeftRight 3Up 1 4 9 1 2 6 15.694 403 017 2.459 866 0.646 029 2.459 866 0.646 029 1.414 214 0.214 297
Table 4: Example instances for three retailer types with unit rates and weights.
4.3 Differences between two or more types
In this section, we discuss observed differences in the optimal menus of contracts for two and three
retailer types. First of all, the bounds on the order quantities in Theorem 4.1 are a unique property
for the case with only two retailer types. To be more specific, an optimal order quantity xk is not
bounded by xk∗R or x
k∗
J when there are more than two retailer types. For an example, see Table 5
where type 2 is not bounded by its default or joint order quantity. In fact, this can even occur if
the retailer type and the supplier both desire the same order quantity, i.e., xk∗R = x
∗
S = x
k∗
J , as the
example in Table 5 shows for type k = 2.
Furthermore, for three or more types it can be optimal to have duplicate contracts in the
menu, as we have shown in Sections 3.6 and 4.2. Recall that by Theorem 3.15 we need additional
assumptions to guarantee to have unique contracts. In contrast, for two types we know from
Theorem 4.1 that the optimal menu never contains duplicate contracts.
Unfortunately, our analysis suggests that for each number of retailer types K we need to solve
some cases from scratch. That is, we were unable to reuse old results forK−1 types in a scalable way
to solve the problem for K types. For example, menus such as those corresponding to Figures 6c and
6d are troublesome. Therefore, the analytical KKT approach does not seem to be a generalisable
solution approach. For a general number of retailer types, the scalable technique described in
Section 2 is preferred.
To conclude, there are significant differences in the qualitative properties of the optimal menu
of contracts for two types compared to more than two types.
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F H f h1 h2 h3 Optimal Menu Objective
3 15 1 1 5 7 1UpRight 2Right 3Up 29.149 616
Type k xk zk x
k∗
R x
k∗
J φS(xk) + zk φS(x
k∗
R )
1 0.844 369 0.192 288 1.414 214 0.707 107 10.078 003 12.727 922
2 0.638 707 0.059 480 0.632 456 0.632 456 9.546 772 9.486 833
3 0.603 023 0.027 234 0.534 522 0.603 023 9.524 842 9.621 405
Table 5: Example instance for K = 3 with unit rates and weights.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Before we conclude with the main insights of our research, we discuss consequences of two model
assumptions. First, using the expected costs as objective function is common in the literature.
However, this can lead to the peculiar situation where the supplier’s action to offer a menu of
contracts results in an increase in the supplier’s costs compared to taking no such action. See
Section 5.1 for more details. Second, we discuss the screening capability of the contracting model
in Section 5.2. Finally, we conclude our findings in Section 5.3.
5.1 Unfavourable realisations
The objective of the contracting model is to minimise the expected costs of the supplier based on
the K scenarios, where each scenario corresponds to a retailer type. Therefore, it could be that for
a certain realisation of the scenarios the supplier is worse off using the menu of contracts instead of
accepting the retailer’s default option. The example in Table 5 shows that this can indeed happen:
for a realisation of the scenario of retailer type 2 the supplier would be better off with the default
option. We note that examples for two retailer types also exist.
If this phenomenon is not allowed, then we have to add the following constraints to the model
to prevent it:
φS(xk) + zk ≤ φS(xk∗R ), ∀ k ∈ K. (5.1)
We can interpret the new constraints (5.1) as the individual rationality constraints for the supplier.
Notice that the menu with all default order quantities and zero side payments is still feasible.
Furthermore, adding these constraints to the default contracting model will lead to an optimal
objective value at least that of the default model.
If we consider the alternative convex model of Section 2.2, the equivalent constraints of (5.1) are
convex. Therefore, we can still efficiently solve the alternative model after adding the IR constraints
for the supplier. Of course, the theoretical analysis has to be redone after adding these constraints.
5.2 Screening capability
The contracting model is often called a screening model, i.e., it allows the supplier to correctly
identify the retailer’s type. The idea is as follows. We have shown that there exists an optimal
solution where the retailer types do not lie about their type (also known as the revelation princi-
ple). Therefore, by observing the contract chosen by the retailer, we can determine its true type.
Unfortunately, this idea has some issues, which we discuss in this section.
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First, we have the issue of the retailer’s indifference between contracts. Consider a type k ∈ K.
If the IC constraint where type k compares to the contract for type l ∈ K is tight, then type k is
indifferent between contracts (xk, zk) and (xl, zl). We have assumed that in this case the supplier
can convince the retailer to choose contract (xk, zk) without any additional cost. Without this
assumption, we need to model the IC constraints as strict inequalities or add a secondary objective
for the retailer to determine its choice. For example, the retailer could be inequity averse, a topic
analysed in Voigt 2015.
Second, it may be optimal to assign the same contract to multiple retailer types. We have
showed in Section 4 that this phenomenon can indeed occur if and only if there are more than two
types. For such an optimal solution, we cannot distinguish those types by the retailer’s choice. Of
course, we can modify the contract to be unique at a small cost in objective value, by the hidden
convexity of the feasible region. Another possibility is to make assumptions on the retailer types
to guarantee unique contracts as seen in Section 3.6.
To conclude, the screening capability of the contracting model should be treated with care,
especially if there are more than two retailer types.
5.3 Main insights
Our model extends the current literature by having a general number of retailer types with
type-dependent default options. The inclusion of type-dependent default options and both order-
ing/setup costs and holding costs for the retailer and supplier increases the structural complexity
of optimal menus of contracts.
Our analysis shows that an optimal menu of contracts for three or more retailer types has
different structural properties than an optimal menu for two types. For two retailer types the
contracts in the optimal menu are unique (see Theorem 4.1). Whereas for three or more retailer
types, it may be optimal to present the same contract to multiple types. This insight affects the
screening capability of the contracting model, as discussed above. However, if the distribution of
the retailer types is uniform and equidistant, then we are guaranteed to have different contracts for
each type (see Theorem 3.15).
Furthermore, for two retailer types the order quantities in the optimal menu lie between their
default and joint order quantities (see Theorem 4.1). This does not hold for more than two types,
as we have counterexamples.
Besides the monotonicity in order quantities, there are also other common properties. In any
optimal menu of contracts the order quantity for at least one type is its joint order quantity (see
Lemma 3.14). If the retailer’s true type is that specific type, then perfect supply chain coordination
takes place. Similarly, in any optimal menu the resulting costs for at least one type is the same as
its default costs.
By considering more than two types we observe additional properties of the retailer’s lying
behaviour. For example, consider three adjacent types with different contracts, say types 1, 2, and
3 with holding costs h1 < h2 < h3 respectively. The following situation cannot occur: types 1 and
3 simultaneously want to lie having (higher, respectively lower) holding cost h2. However, it can
happen that type 2 simultaneously wants to lie having lower (h1) or higher (h3) holding cost. To
our knowledge, such behaviour is uncommon in the literature.
To conclude, we can efficiently solve our model for a general number of retailer types by a
change of decision variables (see Theorem 2.1). Changing the perspective from side payments to
information rents reveals the hidden convexity of our model. Remarkably, the current literature
seems to focus on formulations using side payments. As our case illustrates, the change of perspec-
tive can lead to valuable insights or solution approaches. Therefore, for other contracting models
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we would like to promote the use or investigation of an alternative formulation using information
rents.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.1
In this appendix, we give the proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof only requires some basic calculus
for differentiable convex functions and the results from Section 3.2. In particular, we do not use
the KKT conditions in any way. First, we give two lemmas that relate certain values that appear
in optimal contracts and are needed to prove the theorem.
Lemma A.1. For k ∈ K, xk∗J lies in the closed interval with endpoints xk∗R and x∗S, and is equal to
either endpoint if and only if xk∗R = x
∗
S.
Proof. This follows from simple algebraic manipulation. Let ∼ denote the ordering relation between
two numbers, i.e., ∼∈ {=,≥, >,≤, <}. We have:
xk∗J ∼ xk∗R ⇐⇒
2d(f + F )
hk +H
d
p
∼ 2df
hk
⇐⇒ hk(f + F ) ∼ f(hk +H dp) ⇐⇒ hkF ∼ fH dp
⇐⇒ 2dF
H dp
∼ 2df
hk
⇐⇒ x∗S ∼ xk∗R ,
and a similar equivalence for the supplier: xk∗J ∼ x∗S ⇐⇒ xk∗R ∼ x∗S .
Lemma A.2. For k, l ∈ K with k < l, we have:
xk∗R >
2(φl∗R − φk∗R )
hl − hk > x
l∗
R .
Proof. The square root function is concave, so we can relate its gradient as follows, using hk < hl:
1
2
√
hk
>
√
hl −
√
hk
hl − hk >
1
2
√
hl
.
Therefore, we have
xk∗R =
√
2df
hk
> 2
√
2df
(√
hl −
√
hk
hl − hk
)
=
2(φl∗R − φk∗R )
hl − hk ,
xl∗R =
√
2df
hl
< 2
√
2df
(√
hl −
√
hk
hl − hk
)
=
2(φl∗R − φk∗R )
hl − hk .
This proves the lemma.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Lemma 3.3 any feasible solution must satisfy x1 ≥ x2. Assuming x1 ≥ x2
the optimal side payments are determined by the shortest paths in the corresponding IRIC graph
(see also Corollary 3.5). There are only two paths possible: directly from node s or via the other
retailer node. Thus, the side payments are:
z1 = −min
{
φ1∗R − φ1R(x1),
(
φ2∗R − φ2R(x2)
)
+
(
φ1R(x2)− φ1R(x1)
)}
= max
{
φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R , φ1R(x1)− φ2∗R +
1
2
(h2 − h1)x2
}
= φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R + max
{
0, φ1∗R − φ2∗R +
1
2
(h2 − h1)x2
}
,
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and likewise
z2 = φ
2
R(x2)− φ2∗R + max
{
0, φ2∗R − φ1∗R +
1
2
(h1 − h2)x1
}
.
Therefore, the contribution of x1 to the objective function is
ω1
(
φS(x1) + φ
1
R(x1)
)
+ ω2 max
{
0, φ2∗R − φ1∗R +
1
2
(h1 − h2)x1
}
. (A.1)
The expression in (A.1) is a continuous convex function in x1 with one non-differentiable point.
Consequently, its minimiser is the value of x1 such that the derivative is zero or changes from
negative to positive. The derivative of (A.1) is given byω1
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ 12
(
h1 +H
d
p
))
+ 12ω2(h1 − h2) if x1 <
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
ω1
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ 12
(
h1 +H
d
p
))
otherwise
.
This implies that there are three critical values for x1:
x1 = x
1∗
J , x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
, x1 =
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 .
Notice that we have the following relation indicated by ∼∈ {=,≥, >,≤, <}:
ω1
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x21
+
1
2
(
h1 +H
d
p
))
+
1
2
ω2(h1 − h2) ∼ 0
⇐⇒
(
h1 +H
d
p
+
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
)
x21 ∼ 2d(f + F ).
So if h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2) ≤ 0, the gradient is strictly negative for all x1 < 2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )/(h2−h1).
In this case, the minimiser is given by
x1 = max
{
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 , x
1∗
J
}
.
Otherwise, h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2) > 0 and all critical values are well-defined. Using the fact that
x1∗J =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
<
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
,
we end up with three cases (orderings of the critical values) for x1, see Figure 7. Determining the
minimiser for these cases is straightforward and leads to the optimal value of x1:
x1 = min
{√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
,max
{
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 , x
1∗
J
}}
.
The proof for x2 is similar. Its contribution to the objective value is
ω2
(
φS(x2) + φ
2
R(x2)
)
+ ω1 max
{
0, φ1∗R − φ2∗R +
1
2
(h2 − h1)x2
}
.
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The corresponding derivative isω2
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x22
+ 12
(
h2 +H
d
p
))
+ 12ω1(h2 − h1) if x2 >
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
ω2
(
−d(f + F ) 1
x22
+ 12
(
h2 +H
d
p
))
otherwise
,
with three critical values for x2:
x2 = x
2∗
J , x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω1
ω2
(h2 − h1)
, x2 =
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 .
In contrast to the case for x1, these critical values are always well-defined. See also Figure 7 for
the minimisers, given by the formula
x2 = max
{√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω1
ω2
(h2 − h1)
,min
{
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 , x
2∗
J
}}
.
It remains to verify the final claims on these optimal values for x1 and x2. The fact that x1 > x2
follows from the formulas for the optimal order quantities and√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω1
ω2
(h2 − h1)
<
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
<
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
<
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
.
Thus, the formulas do indeed give feasible order quantities (as x1 ≥ x2 must hold by Lemma 3.3).
Finally, the statement that the optimal order quantities lie between the default and joint order
quantities follows from the formulas and
x1∗R >
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 > x
2∗
R ,
which has been proved in Lemma A.2. The details are as follows. We have:
x1∗R > x
1∗
J =⇒

x1 ≤ max
{
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1 , x
1∗
J
}
< x1∗R
x1 ≥ min
{√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p
+
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2) , x
1∗
J
}
= x1∗J
,
x1∗R ≤ x1∗J =⇒
{
x1 = min
{√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p
+
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2) , x
1∗
J
}
= x1∗J ,
x2∗R ≥ x2∗J =⇒
{
x2 = max
{√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p
+
ω1
ω2
(h2−h1) , x
2∗
J
}
= x2∗J ,
x2∗R < x
2∗
J =⇒

x2 ≥ min
{
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1 , x
2∗
J
}
> x2∗R
x2 ≤ max
{√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p
+
ω1
ω2
(h2−h1) , x
2∗
J
}
= x2∗J
.
Moreover, xk = x
k∗
R if and only if it equals the joint order quantity x
k∗
J and thus corresponds with
the supplier’s own optimal order quantity x∗S (see also Lemma A.1).
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x1
−
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p
− 0
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p+
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2)
+ ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
+
x1
−
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p
− ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
+
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p+
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2)
+
x1
− ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
− 0
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p
+
√
2d(f+F )
h1+H
d
p+
ω2
ω1
(h1−h2)
+
x2
−
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p+
ω1
ω2
(h2−h1)
− 0
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p
+ ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
+
x2
−
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p+
ω1
ω2
(h2−h1)
− ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
+
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p
+
x2
− ∗
2(φ2∗R −φ1∗R )
h2−h1
− 0
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p+
ω1
ω2
(h2−h1)
+
√
2d(f+F )
h2+H
d
p
+
Figure 7: The sign of the derivative of the contribution of x1 and x2 to the objective value. An
asterisk denotes that the point is non-differentiable. The circle indicates the minimiser.
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B Derivation of KKT menus
In this appendix, we derive the menus of contracts that follow from the KKT conditions. We only
consider the cases with two or three retailer types. First, in Section B.1 we give the KKT menus
for certain generalisable patterns that are used for both two and three types. In Section B.2 we
derive all KKT menus for two types. For three types, we only show the analysis for certain cases
from which all results can be reproduced, see Section B.3.
B.1 Simple KKT menus
We can distinguish two types of KKT menus based on the corresponding KKT graph. If the KKT
graph is a spanning tree, we call the corresponding menu a simple KKT menu. The other cases
give so-called complex KKT menus. Recall that by Lemma 3.7 the KKT graph is either a spanning
tree or a strict superset of a spanning tree.
There are three fundamental patterns for simple KKT menus: the Up-tree, Right-tree, and
Left-tree, see Figure 8. That is, for a simple menu each connected component is one of these
patterns. Note that by Lemma 3.8 we have no ‘T-pattern’. In the next sections, we derive the
corresponding KKT menus for each of these simple patterns.
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
. . .
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
(a) Up-tree pattern.
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
. . .
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
(b) Right-tree pattern.
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
. . .
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
s
1 2
. . .
K − 1 K
(c) Left-tree pattern.
Figure 8: The fundamental patterns for simple KKT menus.
B.1.1 Up-tree pattern
For the Up-tree pattern no retailer node has outgoing arcs. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3.13
to determine the order quantities, i.e., we have xk = x
k∗
J for all k ∈ K. The side payments follow
from complementary slackness: since λk > 0 for all k ∈ K, it must hold that φkR(xk) − zk = φk∗R .
This leads to the KKT contract for all k ∈ K:
xk =
√
2d(f + F )
hk +H
d
p
, zk = φ
k
R(xk)− φk∗R .
B.1.2 Right-tree pattern
Based on the spanning tree in the KKT graph, we can determine formulas for the side payments.
Complementary slackness with respect to λ1 > 0 implies that z1 = φ
1
R(x1) − φ1∗R . Likewise,
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φ2R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x1)− z1 must hold, since µ1,2 > 0. After substituting the known value for z1, we
obtain: z2 = φ
2
R(x2) + φ
1
R(x1)− φ2R(x1)− φ1∗R . In general, for retailer type k ∈ K we have:
zk = φ
k
R(xk) +
k−1∑
i=1
(
φiR(xi)− φi+1R (xi)
)− φ1∗R .
For the order quantities, first notice that adding up all KKT stationarity conditions (3.3) leads
to
∑
k∈K λk =
∑
k∈K ωk. For the Right-tree pattern, we have λ1 =
∑
k∈K ωk. Consequently, the
conditions (3.3) imply:
ω1 − λ1 + µ1,2 = 0 =⇒ µ1,2 = λ1 − ω1 =
K∑
i=2
ωi,
ωk − µk−1,k + µk,k+1 = 0 =⇒ µk,k+1 = µk−1,k − ωk =
K∑
i=k+1
ωi,
ωK − µK−1,K = 0 =⇒ µK−1,K = ωK .
Thus, KKT stationarity conditions state
ωk
(
−2d(f + F )
x2k
+ hk +H
d
p
)
+ (hk − hk+1)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi = 0,
which for k ∈ K implies the order quantity:
xk =
√
2d(f + F )
hk +H
d
p + (hk − hk+1) 1ωk
∑K
i=k+1 ωi
.
Note that the order quantities be imaginary (infeasible).
B.1.3 Left-tree pattern
For the Left-tree pattern, the analysis is by symmetry similar to the Right-tree pattern. We have
xk =
√
2d(f + F )
hk +H
d
p + (hk − hk−1) 1ωk
∑k−1
i=1 ωi
> 0,
zk = φ
k
R(xk) +
K∑
i=k+1
(
φiR(xi)− φi−1R (xi)
)− φK∗R .
Here, the order quantities are always well-defined.
B.2 KKT menus for two types
For two retailer types (K = 2) we can reduce the number of KKT menus to consider from 24 = 16
to 5 cases. Table 6 and Figure 5 provide the details of these 5 cases. In the following sections we
derive formulas for the KKT menus. As expected, we see the same possible optimal order quantities
as derived in Theorem 4.1. Furthermore, there is a bijection between the optimal order quantity x
and the KKT graph. See Section 4.1 for numerical examples.
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Case Menu λ1 λ2 µ12 µ21
1 1Up 2Up > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0
2 1UpRight 2x > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
3 1x 2UpLeft = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
4 1UpRight 2Up > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
5 1Up 2UpLeft > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
Table 6: All cases of Lagrange multipliers for two retailer types.
B.2.1 Case 1Up2Up
Since this is a simple KKT menu, the derivation is already given in Section B.1.1. The menu of
contracts is as follows:
x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
> 0, x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
> 0,
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R ≥ 0, z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R ≥ 0.
B.2.2 Case 1UpRight2x
This menu is a Right-tree pattern, see Section B.1.2. The KKT menu is given by:
x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2
ω1
(h1 − h2)
, x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
> 0,
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R ≥ 0, z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2R(x1) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R .
Note that x1 might be infeasible if h2 is large. Likewise, z2 could be negative (infeasible) for certain
cost parameters.
B.2.3 Case 1x2UpLeft
By symmetry, this case is similar to the 1UpRight2x contract, with the roles of types 1 and 2
interchanged:
x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
> 0, x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω1
ω2
(h2 − h1)
> 0,
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1R(x2) + φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R ≥ 0.
Note that z1 could be negative (infeasible) for certain cost parameters.
B.2.4 Case 1UpRight2Up
By complementary slackness and λ1, λ2 > 0, we can directly derive the side payments:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R ≥ 0, z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since node 2 has no outgoing arcs, x2 is the joint order quantity:
x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
> 0.
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Finally, by complementary slackness and µ12 > 0, we have φ
2
R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x1)− z1. Substituting
the formulas for the side payments results in:
φ2∗R = φ
2
R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R ⇐⇒
1
2
(h2 − h1)x1 = φ2∗R − φ1∗R .
Hence, type 1 has order quantity:
x1 =
2
(
φ2∗R − φ1∗R
)
h2 − h1 > 0.
B.2.5 Case 1Up2UpLeft
Again by symmetry, we can reuse the analysis of the 1UpRight2Up contract to obtain:
x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p
> 0, x2 =
2
(
φ2∗R − φ1∗R
)
h2 − h1 > 0,
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R ≥ 0, z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R ≥ 0.
B.3 KKT menus for three types
In this section we derive the menus in case of three retailer types (K = 3), see also Section 4.2.
Table 7 provides an overview of all possible cases. The cases indicated as reducible can be solved
by reusing KKT contracts for K = 2 and by using Lemma 3.13. That is, one retailer type gets
offered the joint order quantity according to Lemma 3.13. For the other two types we can use the
contracts for K = 2 derived earlier. This leaves 14 new cases to solve, but due to symmetry in the
cases only 8 important cases remain. These are shown in Figure 9 and solved below. Compare this
to the 27 = 128 cases that would need to be analysed without using our results.
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Case Menu Reducible λ1 λ2 λ3 µ12 µ21 µ23 µ32
1 1Up 2Up 3Up Yes > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
2 1UpRight 2Up 3Up Yes > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
3 1Up 2UpLeft 3Up Yes > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0
4 1Up 2UpRight 3Up Yes > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
5 1Up 2Up 3UpLeft Yes > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0
6 1UpRight 2UpRight 3Up No > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
7 1UpRight 2Up 3UpLeft No > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0
8 1Up 2UpLeft 3UpLeft No > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
9 1Up 2UpRight 3x Yes > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
10 1UpRight 2UpRight 3x No > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
11 1UpRight 2x 3Up Yes > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
12 1Up 2x 3UpLeft Yes > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0
13 1UpRight 2Right 3Up No > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
14 1Up 2Left 3UpLeft No > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
15 1UpRight 2x 3UpLeft No > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0
16 1UpRight 2LeftRight 3Up No > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
17 1Up 2LeftRight 3UpLeft No > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
18 1x 2UpLeft 3Up Yes = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0
19 1x 2UpLeft 3UpLeft No = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
20 1UpRight 2Right 3x No > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
21 1UpRight 2LeftRight 3x No > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
22 1x 2Left 3UpLeft No = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
23 1x 2LeftRight 3UpLeft No = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Table 7: All cases of Lagrange multipliers for three retailer types.
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Figure 9: Relevant KKT graphs for three retailer types. Not showing reducible or symmetric cases.
B.3.1 Case 1UpRight2UpRight3Up
As usual, the side payments follow directly from the complementary slackness conditions:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3∗R .
Since node 3 has no outgoing arcs, we can apply Lemma 3.13 to obtain the order quantity:
x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
.
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Finally, we use the complementary slackness conditions of the remaining active arcs. First, consider
the following:
φ2∗R = φ
2
R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x1)− z1 = φ2R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R =
1
2
(h2 − h1)x1 + φ1∗R .
Likewise,
φ3∗R = φ
3
R(x3)− z3 = φ3R(x2)− z2 = φ3R(x2)− φ2R(x2) + φ2∗R =
1
2
(h3 − h2)x2 + φ2∗R .
Solving both equalities leads to:
x1 =
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
(h2 − h1) , x2 =
2(φ3∗R − φ2∗R )
(h3 − h2) .
B.3.2 Case 1UpRight2Right3Up
This case is more difficult to solve. The side payments are straightforward to determine:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2R(x1) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3∗R .
Lemma 3.13 specifies the order quantity for retailer type 3:
x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
.
Furthermore, we have
φ3∗R = φ
3
R(x3)− z3 = φ3R(x2)− z2 = φ3R(x2)− φ2R(x2) + φ2R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R
=
1
2
(h3 − h2)x2 + 1
2
(h2 − h1)x1 + φ1∗R ,
that is,
(h2 − h1)x1 + (h3 − h2)x2 = 2(φ3∗R − φ1∗R ).
We also need to rewrite two KKT stationarity conditions, resulting in:
ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h1 +H
d
p
)
+ µ12 = 0,
ω2
(h2 − h3)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x22
+ h2 +H
d
p
)
+ µ23 = 0.
Combining these two equations and using ω2 − µ12 + µ23 = 0 leads to:
ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h1 +H
d
p
)
− ω2
(h2 − h3)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x22
+ h2 +H
d
p
)
+ ω2 = 0,
which is equivalent to
−2d(f + F )ω1
(h1 − h2)
1
x21
− −2d(f + F )ω2
(h2 − h3)
1
x22
=
ω2
(h2 − h3)
(
h2 +H
d
p
)
− ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
h1 +H
d
p
)
− ω2.
To conclude, we have to solve a pair of equations for which we can use Lemma B.1 in Sec-
tion B.3.9. As proved in the lemma, there exists a unique strictly positive and real solution. Both
exact closed-form formulas and an efficient numerical solution method exist to solve these equations.
Unfortunately, the formulas for x1 and x2 are too verbose to state here and will be omitted.
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B.3.3 Case 1UpRight2UpRight3x
The side payments are:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3R(x2) + φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R .
As seen before, the order quantity of type 3 follows from Lemma 3.13:
x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
.
Complementary slackness states that
φ2∗R = φ
2
R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x1)− z1 = φ2R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R ,
that is,
x1 =
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 .
Finally, from the KKT stationarity conditions we have µ23 = ω3 and
ω2
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x22
+ h2 +H
d
p
)
+ ω3(h2 − h3) = 0,
leading to
x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω3
ω2
(h2 − h3)
.
B.3.4 Case 1UpRight2Right3x
This is a simple KKT menu, namely the Right-tree pattern (see Section B.1.2). The menu of
contracts is given by the order quantities
x1 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω2+ω3
ω1
(h1 − h2)
, x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p +
ω3
ω2
(h2 − h3)
, x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
,
and side payments
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R ,
z2 = φ
2
R(x2)− φ2R(x1) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R ,
z3 = φ
3
R(x3)− φ3R(x2) + φ2R(x2)− φ2R(x1) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R .
B.3.5 Case 1UpRight2Up3UpLeft
We apply the general solution technique to find:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3∗R ,
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and
x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
.
Now use complementary slackness:
φ2∗R = φ
2
R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x1)− z1 = φ2R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R .
We obtain a similar equation for x3. Hence, we have
x1 =
2(φ2∗R − φ1∗R )
h2 − h1 , x3 =
2(φ3∗R − φ2∗R )
h3 − h2 .
B.3.6 Case 1UpRight2x3UpLeft
This case is one of the more difficult cases. The side payments are:
z1 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z2 = φ2R(x2)− φ2R(x1) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3∗R .
The order quantity for type 2 is straightforward:
x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h2 +H
d
p
.
We use complementary slackness to find the following equation:
φ2R(x1)− z1 = φ2R(x2)− z2 = φ2R(x3)− z3
⇐⇒ φ2R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R = φ2R(x3)− φ3R(x3) + φ3∗R
⇐⇒ (h2 − h1)x1 + (h3 − h2)x3 = 2(φ3∗R − φ1∗R ).
The following derivation has been used before. We rewrite two KKT stationarity conditions:
ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h1 +H
d
p
)
+ µ12 = 0,
ω3
(h3 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x23
+ h3 +H
d
p
)
+ µ32 = 0.
Next, combine both equations and use ω2 − µ12 − µ32 = 0:
ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h1 +H
d
p
)
+
ω3
(h3 − h2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x23
+ h3 +H
d
p
)
+ ω2 = 0,
which is equivalent to
−2d(f + F )ω1
(h1 − h2)
1
x21
− −2d(f + F )ω3
(h2 − h3)
1
x23
=
ω3
(h2 − h3)
(
h3 +H
d
p
)
− ω1
(h1 − h2)
(
h1 +H
d
p
)
− ω2.
Thus, we solve the pair of equations using Lemma B.1. As stated in the lemma, a unique strictly
positive and real solution exists. The formulas for x1 and x3 are too verbose and will be omitted.
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B.3.7 Case 1UpRight2LeftRight3Up
From Corollary 3.11 we know that x1 = x2 and z1 = z2. Hence, we have side payments
z1 = z2 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3∗R .
As before, the order quantity of type 3 is:
x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
.
Using complementary slackness results in:
φ3∗R = φ
3
R(x3)− z3 = φ3R(x2)− z2 = φ3R(x1)− z1 = φ3R(x1)− φ1R(x1) + φ1∗R .
Solving for x1 gives:
x1 = x2 =
2(φ3∗R − φ1∗R )
h3 − h1 .
B.3.8 Case 1UpRight2LeftRight3x
The 2-cycle implies that x1 = x2 and z1 = z2. First, we give the side payments:
z1 = z2 = φ
1
R(x1)− φ1∗R , z3 = φ3R(x3)− φ3R(x2) + φ1R(x1)− φ1∗R ,
where by Lemma 3.13
x3 =
√
2d(f + F )
h3 +H
d
p
.
The KKT stationarity conditions state that µ23 = ω3, hence µ12 − µ21 = ω2 + ω3. Adding up the
KKT conditions
ω1
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h1 +H
d
p
)
+ µ12(h1 − h2) = 0,
ω2
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+ h2 +H
d
p
)
+ µ21(h2 − h1) + ω3(h2 − h3) = 0,
leads to:
(ω1 + ω2)
(
−2d(f + F ) 1
x21
+H
d
p
)
+ ω1h1 + ω2h2 + (ω2 + ω3)(h1 − h2) + ω3(h2 − h3) = 0.
To conclude, the order quantity for types 1 and 2 is equal to:
x1 = x2 =
√
2d(f + F )
h1 +H
d
p +
ω3
ω1+ω2
(h1 − h3)
.
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B.3.9 Special system of equations
In this section we discuss a special system of equations that needs to be solved for certain KKT
contracts. See Lemma B.1 for the details.
Lemma B.1. Consider the pair of equations of the following form:
α1x1 + α2x2 = γ1, β1
1
x21
− β2 1
x22
= γ2,
where α1, α2, β1, β2, γ1 ∈ R>0 and γ2 ∈ R are given parameters. These equations always have a
unique strictly positive real solution, i.e., satisfying x1, x2 ∈ R>0.
Proof. First, suppose γ2 = 0. We have
β1
1
x21
= β2
1
x22
⇐⇒ x1 =
√
β1
β2
x2.
Thus, the other equation implies that
α1
√
β1
β2
x2 + α2x2 = γ1 ⇐⇒ x2 = γ1
α1
√
β1
β2
+ α2
> 0.
This proves the claim for γ2 = 0.
Next, consider the case that γ2 < 0. Notice that we can solve this case by finding the roots of
a forth degree polynomial, for which an exact closed-form formula exists. This polynomial follows
from substitution of one equation in the other. What remains is to show that exactly one of these
four roots is strictly positive and real. To do so, solve the non-linear equation for x2:
x2 =
√
β2
β1
1
x21
− γ2
=
√
β2x1√
β1 − γ2x21
.
This is a well-defined strictly positive solution for x1 > 0. Furthermore, we have x2 = γ1/α2 −
(α1/α2)x1. Figure 10a shows the corresponding curves in the positive quadrant. Since the limits
for x1 → 0 and x1 → ∞ are well-defined, this proves that a unique strictly positive real solution
exists.
The case that γ2 > 0 is similar, see Figure 10b, and will not be shown.
(0, 0) (
γ1
α1
, 0
)
(
0, γ1α2
)
(
0,
√
β2
−γ2
)
x1
x2
α1x1 + α2x2 = γ1
β1
1
x21
− β2 1x22 = γ2
(a) Curve if γ2 < 0.
(0, 0) (
γ1
α1
, 0
)
(
0, γ1α2
)
(√
β1
γ2
, 0
) x1
x2
α1x1 + α2x2 = γ1
β1
1
x21
− β2 1x22 = γ2
(b) Curve if γ2 > 0.
Figure 10: Solution curve in the positive quadrant.
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For completeness sake, we show how to numerically find the solution efficiently. Again, we
assume γ2 < 0 (γ2 > 0 is similar). Consider the function θ for x ∈ R≥0:
θ(x) =
√
β2x√
β1 − γ2x2
+
α1
α2
x− γ1
α2
∈
[
− γ1
α2
,∞
)
,
dθ
dx
(x) =
β1
√
β2
(β1 − γ2x2)3/2
+
α1
α2
∈
(
α1
α2
,
√
β2
β1
+
α1
α2
]
.
Solving θ(x) = 0 is equivalent to finding the value x1. We only need to search in the bounded
domain x ∈ (0, γ1/α1), since
α1x1 = γ1 − α2x2 < γ1 =⇒ x1 < γ1/α1,
and x1, x2 > 0. As α1/α2 > 0, the derivative of θ is never zero. For example, if α1 = α2 = β1 =
β2 = 1, then the derivative lies between 1 and 2. This suggests that methods such as Newton-
Raphson should work very well and numerical results confirm fast and accurate convergence in
typically less than 10 iterations.
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